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come from U.S. conservatives who sim-
ply reject the idea of the U.N. as an insti-
tution helpful to U.S. purposes.  They 
have made these attacks because they 
vastly overestimate U.S. power, thinking 
that the U.S. is omnipotent and therefore 
in no need of international cooperation.  
They view the U.N. as an artificial and 
unnecessary constraint on U.S. authority 
and action.  In neo-con fantasies, the US 
can clean up the world on its own.  In-
stead, we are now left with the quagmire 
in Iraq and the collapse of U.S. prestige 
abroad.   
The truth is that the U.S. vitally needs 
global cooperation on a wide range of 
issues in order to meet essential U.S. 
security interests.  An avian flu pandemic 
will not be forestalled or controlled by 
stockpiling drugs in the U.S.  Control 
will require a coordinated international 
effort of disease surveillance, culling of 
bird populations, and global cooperation 
on the testing and development of new 
medicines and immunizations.  Infectious 
disease control is truly a global chal-
lenge, as the AIDS pandemic (and the 
plague, Spanish Flu, smallpox, and many 
more epidemics) should have taught us a 
long time ago.   
Similarly, the U.S. will need worldwide 
cooperation on climate change, lest the 
American Gulf Coast become a regular 
victim of high-intensity hurricanes.  The 
Bush Administration sneers at the Kyoto 
Agreement, negotiated in the context of 
the U.N. Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, but the U.S. will likely feel 
very differently, once China is the 
world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, 
It’s often said that the U.N. failed in re-
cent years, most notably over the war in 
Iraq.  Yet, what really failed was unilater-
alist U.S. foreign policy.  The Bush Ad-
ministration’s decision to launch a war 
without the backing of the U.N. Security 
Council – indeed with the clear interna-
tional message that the case for war had 
not been made – weakened the U.N. in 
the short term, but bolstered the case for 
the U.N. in the longer term. The real de-
feat, and hopefully a lasting one, has 
been to the Bush Administration’s unilat-
eralist reveries, which were always di-
vorced from global realities.    
The standing of the U.S. in the world has 
been damaged by this unilateralism, and 
so too has the reputation of the U.N., at 
least in the short term.  The damage has 
been amplified by the Oil-for-Food scan-
dal.  Yet even in the context of the scan-
dal, U.S. politics is at play.  The scandal 
is being cynically exploited by U.S. poli-
ticians to weaken the U.N., rather than to 
improve its operations.  Indeed, the in-
tense criticism of U.N. management is 
coming from a Government whose own 
Iraq Occupation Authority cannot ac-
count for billions of dollars of Iraqi oil 
revenues since 2003, with the clear indi-
cation that vast sums have in fact been 
looted.    
The Oil-for-Food program was surely 
flawed in innumerable ways, but most of 
these had been recognized for years, and 
the U.N. Security Council members, in-
cluding the U.S., had ample information 
had they cared to look.  In fact, the U.S. 
and others deliberately closed their eyes 
to the mess because they wanted the 
sanctions against Iraq to persist in the 
vain hope that the sanctions would help 
topple Saddam from the inside.  The 
more recent U.S. indignation about the 
botched sanctions scheme recalls the 
scene in Casablanca where Inspector 
Renaud is “shocked, shocked” to dis-
cover the gambling at Rick’s Café.  We 
are a witness to a wonderful burst of mor-
alizing that may depict the opposite of 
what it suggests on the surface.   
The drumbeats of attack on the U.N. have 
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with adverse results felt by way of 
American hurricanes, droughts, rising 
ocean levels, and more.  The U.S. obvi-
ously needs considerable cooperation on 
nuclear proliferation, whether in North 
Korea or Iran, and benefited from over-
seas leadership in the success story of 
Libya’s return to the international fold in 
recent years.   
The U.S. will also need global coopera-
tion in the fight against world poverty.  
This is a fight that Washington has barely 
acknowledged, and hardly lifted a budg-
etary finger to address.  The U.S. fiscal 
efforts towards the world’s poor are de 
minimis, a few cents in the federal budget 
for each hundred dollars of U.S. GNP. 
These fall vastly short of the promises 
that the U.S. has solemnly made to the 
international community, and, of course, 
of what is needed.  Global poverty is 
regarded as a soft issue by the Bush Ad-
ministration, not worthy of “serious” 
strategists’ time and attention.  U.S. ne-
gotiators even tried to expunge the Mil-
lennium Development Goals from the 
international commitments in the lead up 
to the U.N. World Summit in September 
2005, an attempt strongly rejected by the 
rest of the world.     
In fact, the issues that do engage the 
Washington strategists—whether oil, or 
security, or terrorism, or avian flu, or 
narcotrafficking—are each inextricably 
linked to poverty and to the geopolitical 
instability that results from poverty.  The 
U.S. confronts the fallout from poverty 
every day in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, 
Somalia, the Palestinian territories, Bo-
livia, and countless other places.  Our 
government is utterly incapable of—and, 
to date, utterly uninterested in—meeting 
the challenge of global poverty on its 
own.  The budgetary costs would be ex-
orbitant compared with the costs of a 
cooperative approach.   
The politics of fighting poverty require 
multilateralism, lest any single country’s 
development assistance appear too over-
bearing or intrusive.  And the U.S., quite 
simply, lacks the requisite expertise in 
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rectly with the immediate concerns of the 
newly aroused world: peacekeeping, 
elections monitoring, humanitarian aid, 
disease control, and poverty reduction, 
among others.  It can overcome national 
rivalries in order to mediate conflicts.  
Although it cannot easily restrain the 
powerful, it can help to defuse many of 
the dangerous, potentially escalatory 
points of tension among them. 
Above all, the U.N. is a unique fount of 
global legitimacy.  A March 2005 BBC 
poll revealed support for the U.N. becom-
ing “significantly more powerful in world 
affairs.” Majorities in 21 of the 23 coun-
tries polled, including the U.S., would 
find such an expansion “mainly positive,” 
with a global average of 64 percent.  The 
U.N.’s legitimacy springs, in part, from 
its structural affirmation of the equality 
of sovereign states, and in part from its 
demonstrated ability to address the needs 
of those weak and developing sovereigns 
that comprise the bulk of its membership.  
Moreover, the U.N. enjoys the benefit of 
being born in a rare historical moment, 
when exhaustion, imbalance of power, 
and the upending of the established order 
enabled innovative political bargains.  In 
short, the U.N. has a legitimacy that no 
single nation could generate alone—and 
that no new institution could replace.     
These advantages can be harnessed to 
promote the imperatives of U.S. global 
leadership, for several reasons.  First, the 
U.N. is ultimately run by member states, 
among which America predominates—it 
has vastly more political influence, eco-
nomic heft, and military capability than 
any other state.  Second, America led the 
creation of the U.N., and built into its 
structure and procedure distinct U.S. ad-
vantages.  These include the power of a 
permanent seat and veto on the Security 
Council, the diffuse benefits of serving as 
the U.N.’s geographic locus, and the 
ideological and political usefulness of a 
U.N. Charter, Declaration of Human 
Rights, and framework of Covenants that 
largely reflect American values and pri-
orities.  Third, the U.N. depends for its 
vitality, effectiveness, and solvency on 
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The United Nations embodies an unusual 
political experiment.  It was an attempt, 
led by America, to combine within a sin-
gle framework two elemental contradic-
tions in international politics:  the equal-
ity of sovereignty and the inequality of 
power.  Its structure reflects this tension, 
most obviously in the counterpoise be-
tween a General Assembly open to all 
sovereign states and a permanent Secu-
rity Council directorship reserved for the 
dominant.  This fusion sometimes breeds 
dysfunction, but it also gives rise to a 
unique virtue:  it allows the U.N. to func-
tion in a world still governed by power 
while infusing the organization with an 
unparalleled global legitimacy. 
The U.S. government’s recent attitude 
toward the U.N. seems oblivious to this 
singular historical advantage.  U.S. offi-
cials and legislators treat the U.N. either 
as a hindrance to U.S. policies or as a 
mere cipher through which to ram U.S. 
priorities.  In the 2002–3 debate over 
Iraq, top American officials approached 
the U.N., but only in pursuit of a rubber 
stamp: they made specious arguments, 
peddled dubious evidence, and simulta-
neously declared their conviction that 
U.N. inspections were pointless.  Their 
commitment to deliberation was clearly 
unserious.   
Now the watchword is reform.  Without 
question, the U.N. suffers from ineffi-
ciencies and corruption, all of which de-
mand reform.  But only ideological over-
zealousness can explain, for example, the 
five concurrent, independent Congres-
sional investigations of the “Oil-for-
Food” scandal.  In our sometimes chau-
vinistic preoccupation with every inade-
quacy of the U.N., we have lost sight of 
how the U.N. serves U.S. interests. 
We discount the value of the U.N. in part 
because we have misunderstood Amer-
ica’s central challenge in the twenty-first 
century.  It is not only terrorism.  It is not 
an abstract “hatred of freedom.”  It is a 
far more profound transformation of 
world politics—what Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski has called “the global political awak-
ening of mankind.”  Advances in technol-
ogy, global communication, and educa-
tion, catalyzed by great waves of political 
radicalization and revolution, have 
aroused the political self-consciousness 
of the masses of humanity that, for mil-
lennia, had known only a life of resigned 
inaction and subservience to the imposi-
tions of fate.  Now they know their latent 
political power, and they want to assert it.  
Amid this broad historical transforma-
tion, moreover, we are witnessing the 
nascent resurrection of Asia—the re-
emergence of China and India as engines 
of political, economic, and social energy.  
They are grasping for great power, proud 
to have lifted off the humiliating yoke of 
imperialism and resolved to restore their 
historical eminence. 
The combination of the political awaken-
ing of the masses and the resurgence of 
Asian power will generate enormous 
challenges to America’s position.  As the 
global hegemon, America draws the dis-
contentment of the disenfranchised and 
the envy of the ambitious.  The former 
identify their miseries with a U.S.-led 
international status quo; the latter seek 
leadership of a post-American future.  At 
the same time, U.S. well-being is irre-
versibly tied to that of the world.  Our 
national economy intertwines with the 
global economy, our political and mili-
tary commitments touch every continent 
and contribute decisively to stability, and 
since the early twentieth century we have 
proven unable to insulate ourselves from 
upheavals abroad.  In this context, an 
egoistic foreign policy would be self-
destructive.  The U.S. must find a way 
simultaneously to secure its interests, 
accommodate the rise of new powers 
while avoiding, in this nuclear age, the 
earth-shattering eruptions that have punc-
tuated such power shifts in the past, and 
create a political framework that gives 
real  voice to a politically awakened 
world. 
The U.N. will be an important element in 
any such strategy.  As a June 2005 bipar-
tisan Congressional report recognizes, the 
U.N. has many practical virtues.  It has a 
range of special expertise that deals di-
Most importantly, it means going through 
the U.N. to address international prob-
lems such as terrorism, weapons prolif-
eration, and AIDS, not operating alone or 
through ad hoc coalitions. 
One might ask why the U.S. would want 
to invigorate the U.N. The cynical answer 
is that there is no reason why.  But the 
cynics cannot explain the constructive 
reform proposals that the Bush admini-
stration has made of late, or U.S. diplo-
mats’ vigorous participation in the U.N. 
summit.  The U.S.’s recent actions vis-à-
vis the U.N., then, suggest that key poli-
cymakers have recognized the organiza-
tion’s value and are trying in good faith 
to improve it.  This is why the U.S. is-
sued its recommendations for structural 
reform—and why the U.S. should com-
plement these proposals with a renewed 
commitment to solving world problems 
through the U.N.’s auspices.  
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the U.N.’s structure, and there is no indi-
cation that the administration cares much 
about the organization’s long-term effi-
cacy.  If anything, the disdain the U.S. 
has shown toward the U.N. over the past 
few years suggests that the administra-
tion’s goal may be to use the reform issue 
to discredit and marginalize the organiza-
tion, not to improve it. 
The problems with structural reform are 
twofold.  First, there is a danger that U.N. 
member states, having overhauled the 
organization’s institutional arrangements, 
will fail to take steps to prevent backslid-
ing.  A leaner Human Rights Council 
could prove just as feeble as its predeces-
sor, and measures to increase Secretariat 
accountability and transparency mean 
little if they are not vigilantly enforced.  
Second, and more fundamentally, the 
reason for the U.N.’s poor performance 
in many areas is not its structure but 
rather its very nature as an organization 
in which every country, large and small, 
rich and poor, is represented. If the U.N. 
is inefficient and ineffective, this is 
largely because the nations of the world 
are many in number and frequently di-
vided.  Smaller committees and crisper 
lines of authority will not suddenly con-
vert the U.N. into a model of Teutonic 
precision. 
None of this is to say that structural re-
form is not important.  Better to have a 
United Nations whose institutional ar-
rangements are a management consult-
ant’s dream, than the bureaucratic night-
mare of today.  But those who care about 
the U.N.’s performance and prestige 
should realize that structural reform alone 
is not enough.  Rather, the U.N. can only 
succeed if its member states—the United 
States in particular—show that they are 
committed to the organization, and invest 
substantial political capital (and money) 
in it.  For the U.S., this means abiding by 
the procedures of the General Assembly 
and Security Council, frustrating though 
they may sometimes be.  It means halting 
the recurring kabuki dance in which Con-
gress threatens to withhold funding for 
the U.N. until certain conditions are met.  
With the organization celebrating its six-
tieth birthday this year, there has been 
much talk of late about how to reform the 
United Nations.  Secretary General Kofi 
Annan issued a report in the spring call-
ing for an expanded Security Council, a 
new Human Rights Council, the abolition 
of the Trusteeship Council, and several 
amendments to the U.N. Charter.  The 
United States has supported most of these 
ideas, and has also proposed a new de-
mocracy fund, a peace-building commis-
sion, a comprehensive convention on 
terrorism, and stricter auditing of the 
Secretariat’s operations.  At the organiza-
tion’s recent summit in New York, U.N. 
reform dominated the agenda. 
The U.N. clearly has major structural 
problems, and many of the proposals 
under consideration do seem well-suited 
to address them.  The Security Council, 
for instance, reflects the power balance of 
1945 (and rather poorly at that), and 
should be revamped so that it captures 
current geopolitical realities.  The Human 
Rights Commission, similarly, has been 
disgraced by both its fecklessness and the 
alarming frequency with which rights-
abusing nations chair the body.  A leaner 
Human Rights Council with fewer rights 
violators among its ranks would represent 
an undeniable improvement.  And stricter 
auditing, monitoring, and reporting re-
quirements might not transform the 
U.N.’s bureaucratic culture overnight, but 
would at least announce that the days of 
cronyism and waste are over. 
U.N. reform, then, is sorely needed.  But 
there is a tendency—both within the U.S. 
and around the world—to emphasize 
one-off structural changes at the expense 
of the steady commitment and effort that 
are necessary for the U.N. to succeed.  
Globally, the issue of U.N. reform is of-
ten reduced to the question of Security 
Council composition.  Politicians and 
reporters talk little about how to make the 
U.N. more honest and efficient, and very 
much about which particular powers 
should be represented on the Security 
Council.  Domestically, most of the Bush 
administration’s proposals have related to 
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tropical agronomy, public health, and 
many other fields to get the job done on 
its own. 
The U.N. can and should be a locus of 
global leadership on issues critical to U.S. 
security.  U.N. agencies are vital to ad-
dressing the challenges of public health, 
food production, financial stability, trade, 
climate change, biodiversity conserva-
tion, nuclear proliferation, energy sup-
plies for a growing world economy, and 
more.  The U.S. should stop weakening 
the U.N. through budget cuts and freezes, 
brazen political attacks, and other threats.  
It’s time to raise our investments in the 
U.N. for the sake of national and global 
security, the very reasons that led the 
U.S. to champion this vital institution 
when it helped to establish it over 60 
years ago.      
Jeffrey D. Sachs is Director of the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University.  These 
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